Abstract-This paper presents a security analysis for data-hiding methods based on nested lattice codes, extending the analysis provided by previous works to a more general scenario. The security is quantified as the difficulty of estimating the secret key used in the embedding process, assuming that the attacker has several signals watermarked available with the same secret key. The theoretical analysis accomplished in the first part of this paper quantifies security in an information-theoretic sense by means of the mutual information between the watermarked signals and the secret key, addressing important issues, such as the possibility of achieving perfect secrecy and the impact of the embedding rate in the security level. In the second part, a practical algorithm for estimating the secret key is proposed, and the information extracted is used for implementing a reversibility attack on real images.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ATERMARKING security has emerged in the last few years as a new research topic, whose basics can be found in [1] - [3] and the references therein. The framework for security analysis adopted in these works follows a cryptanalytic approach: all of the parameters of the watermarking scheme are assumed to be public, and the security relies only on a secret key. Similar to a cryptographic key, the latter will be used, in general, for watermarking several pieces of content. Depending on the considered application, the number of contents watermarked with the same key may be very large, constituting a security risk. Thus, the main target of the security analysis is to determine whether the watermarking scheme properly conceals the secret key; if it is not the case, then we are interested in assessing the security level of the scheme, defined as the number of observations (i.e., signals watermarked with the same key)
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS. 2008.2002938 needed to achieve an estimate of the secret key up to a certain accuracy [2] . As in cryptanalysis, the development of practical attacks for estimating secret keys must be considered to be an important part of security analysis. The importance of the proposed framework lies in that a successful attack to security offers a complete break of the watermarking system. If the attacker manages to accurately estimate the secret key, then he or she has total access to the watermarking channel [1] , [4] for embedding and decoding hidden information at will, and even for removing watermarks with small distortion. As an illustrative example of a scenario that fits the framework described in this paper, we can mention fingerprinting applications, where a seller embeds identification codes of the buyers in the digital contents to be sold, with the purpose of enabling their traceability. In this case, each content contains different embedded information, but all of the contents will have been watermarked with the secret key of the seller. Thus, a possible approach for the buyers in order to implement a collusion attack (although many other approaches are possible) is to estimate the secret key first and then to remove the watermark of each content. In this case, a security analysis could provide an approximate figure of the observations needed for successfully implementing such a collusion attack, giving a certain advantage to the seller. In this paper, we focus on the security analysis of data-hiding schemes based on nested lattice codes [5] , usually known as lattice distortion compensation-dither modulation (DC-DM) schemes, which have been widely studied in the last few years, mainly due to the connection between Costa's result [6] and recent works on lattice codes [7] . However, their study from the security viewpoint has not been addressed until very recently in [8] . The analysis in [8] was mainly restricted to the so-called "Known Message Attack" (KMA) scenario, where the messages embedded in each watermarked signal were assumed to be known by the attacker. Although the KMA scenario provides important insights into the security of lattice DC-DM, for a complete security analysis, it is necessary to consider a more general setup: the "Watermarked Only Attack" (WOA) scenario [1] , where the attacker no longer knows anything about the embedded messages. This paper extends the theory and algorithms developed in [8] to WOA, presenting in a more rigorous manner, the results reported in [9] . As in [8] and [9] , the tool for measuring the security is the mutual information between the observations and the secret key (a.k.a. information leakage), which provides a lower bound on the key estimation error (see [8, ). Intuitively, smaller information leakage implies a higher security level, because in that case, the attacker needs a larger number of observations in order to achieve the same key estimation error. The first part of this paper measures the information leakage about the key for lattice DC-DM schemes, putting special emphasis on the comparison between KMA and WOA scenarios. The possibility of achieving perfect secrecy is also addressed. The second part of this paper shows how the information about the key provided by the observations can be extracted and used in practical scenarios, proposing a reversibility attack based on the estimated key. The proposed estimation algorithm works with any arbitrary nested lattice code, and is applicable to high embedding rate scenarios.
The main notational conventions used in this paper are the following: random variables are denoted by capital letters, and vectors represented by boldface letters. Calligraphic letters are reserved for sets. The volume of a bounded set is denoted by , whereas the cardinality of a discrete set with a countable number of elements is denoted by . and denote entropy and differential entropy [10] , respectively, both expressed in natural units. The indicator function, denoted by and defined as otherwise (1) will be widely used throughout the text. The probability density function of a random variable is denoted by , and the expectation of a function over is denoted by . The -ary alphabet that represents the messages to be transmitted is defined as . The "message space," defined as , represents the possible message sequences that can be formed with such an alphabet in channel uses. The sequences in can be arranged using any arbitrary ordering (their value in base , for instance), not relevant for our analysis. The notation will be used for indexing the th sequence in .
II. THEORETICAL MODEL
This section introduces the mathematical model for lattice data hiding and the lattice constructions used in this paper. As this introduction is not intended to be exhaustive, the interested reader is referred to [11] for a comprehensive description of lattices, and to [5] for a more complete description of lattice codes for data hiding. The assumptions about the attacker are also stated at the end of this section.
A. Lattices and Nested Lattice Codes
Algebraically, a lattice is defined as a discrete subgroup of endowed with the natural addition operation. A lattice in -dimensional space can be generated by any integer combination of a set of linearly independent basis vectors , which form the "generating matrix" of . Every lattice has an associated nearest neighbor lattice quantizer which maps any vector to the nearest lattice point of , and is defined as (2) where denotes the Euclidean norm. Ties in (2) can be broken arbitrarily but systematically. The fundamental Voronoi region of , a concept that will be frequently recalled in this paper, is defined as [11] and corresponds to the -dimensional polytope wherein all points are quantized to . The volume of a lattice is defined as the volume of its Voronoi region, and will be denoted by . We will also define the modulo-reduction of a vector as and the modulo-reduced vector will be denoted by . Notice that , and it can be regarded as the quantization error resulting from the quantization operation.
The application of lattices to data hiding is based on the concept of "lattice partitioning." Given a certain lattice , we can define a sublattice which is a subset of the points in (i.e., ) and is itself a lattice. The set , with , is known as a coset of . Due to the periodic structure of lattices, infinite exist that yield the same coset. The vector with the smallest Euclidean norm is called a "coset leader." From the definitions of lattice and the Voronoi region, it follows that the coset leaders always belong to . The set of all cosets of with respect to is called the "partition" of induced by , and it carries a group structure with the natural addition operation. It can be proved that the number of different cosets is given by the so-called "nesting ratio"
. The union of the cosets yields the lattice (i.e., ), where denotes the coset leaders. A nested lattice code is defined by two parameters: a shaping (coarse) lattice and a fine lattice such that . The pair defines a partition which, in turn, yields a set of coset leaders or codewords . Each letter is mapped to one coset leader and, thus, to the th coset of . Although the mapping between elements of and can be arbitrary, we will assume that the letter 0 corresponds to . Nested lattice codes can be constructed in a number of ways. Although most results of this paper are quite general, we focus in some cases on two particular constructions, given their importance: the self-similar lattice construction [12] and the so-called "Construction A" [11] , [13] . In the self-similar construction, the nested code is obtained as follows. 1 1) Define a positive integer , where is the dimensionality of . 2) Compute the fine lattice as . It follows that the lattice is a sublattice of , resulting in a nesting ratio , and an embedding rate .
3) Obtain the set of coset leaders as . In Construction A, the nested lattice code is completely specified by a "generating vector" and the lattice . It is summarized as follows.
1) Define a positive integer and a generating vector , where . Compute the codebook , which is contained in the hypercube . Then, construct the lattice . 2) Define the generating matrix (where each row is a basis vector) of the coarse (shaping) lattice . Apply the linear transformation . It immediately follows that is a sublattice of and the nesting ratio is , resulting in a coding rate .
3) The set of coset leaders is given by , or equivalently,
. Notice that the mapping between the letters of the alphabet and the coset leaders follows directly from the construction procedure. The advantage of Construction A over the self-similar construction is that it allows building codes of arbitrary rate (without the restriction ). Moreover, if is chosen as a prime number and is a good lattice for mean square error (MSE) quantization, then good (asymptotic) properties of the code are ensured [13] .
Examples of 2-D nested lattice codes are shown in Fig. 1 , using a hexagonal-shaping lattice and . For Construction A, the generating vector was chosen. In both cases, the lattice points belonging to the same coset are represented by the same symbol. Notice that [as in Fig. 1(a) ] a coset leader may fall exactly in the frontier between several quantization cells.
B. Embedding and Decoding
The mathematical model for lattice data hiding considered in this paper is shown in Fig. 2 . First, the host signal is partitioned into nonoverlapping blocks of length . The message to be embedded may undergo channel coding, yielding the symbols . In our setup, the messages embedded in different blocks are assumed to be equiprobable in and independent from each other, unless otherwise stated. The parameter is a -dimensional vector, termed "secret dither," used to randomize the embedding and decoding functions. This vector plays the role of secret key. In the lattice DC-DM scheme, each letter is embedded in one block by means of a randomized lattice quantizer as shown in Fig. 2 . First, using , , and (the shaping lattice), the coset is obtained, where is the coset leader associated with .
Thereafter, the block is quantized to the nearest point in and the resulting quantization error is computed. Finally, this quantization error is scaled by the "distortion compensation parameter"
, and added back to in order to obtain the watermarked block . Mathematically
where is a nearest-neighbor quantizer whose centroids are distributed according to . Taking into account that , the embedding function (3) is usually implemented in practice by means of a "dithered" lattice quantizer as follows: (4) Notice that (4) is equivalent to (3) and to the embedder depicted in Fig. 2 . The distortion caused by the embedding process can be computed by resorting to the usual assumption (a.k.a. "flat-host assumption") that the variance of the components of is sufficiently large, in such a way that the host distribution is uniform inside each quantization cell. Thus, from (4), the embedding distortion per dimension in an MSE sense results in where denotes the second-order moment per dimension of the Voronoi region of [11] .
The most popular decoders are those called "lattice decoders," where the embedded message is estimated by choosing the coset which is closest to the received (attacked) vector , where represents the transformation applied by the attacker to . Hence, the lattice decoder can be mathematically formulated as (5) where denotes the Euclidean norm. Bear in mind that the decoder needs the correct realization of for successful performance. Traditionally, the attacker designs the function without taking into account the secret dither . In this paper, however, the attacker focuses his or her strategy on , as will be explained. 
C. Assumptions on the Attacker's Strategy
With regard to the attacker's strategy, it is assumed that he or she manages to gather an ensemble of watermarked blocks (hereinafter, "observations"), which may belong to different host signals, but all of them were watermarked with the same secret key . Notice that this is a reasonable assumption, since a user is very unlikely to change his or her secret key every time he or she watermarks an object; in fact, depending on the considered scenario, the number of available observations could be fairly large. We further assume, sticking to Kerckhoffs' principle [15] , that the attacker knows the embedding parameters being used (i.e., , , and ), whereas he or she ignores the host blocks , the embedded symbols , and . The first step performed by the attacker is the modulo reduction of the watermarked blocks as . Under the flat-host assumption introduced before (Section II-B), such modulo reduction does not imply any loss of information for the attacker, as discussed in [8] . Note that (4) can be rewritten as (6) where and . Thus, the modulo-reduced observations seen by the attacker are given by (7) From (7), it becomes clear that the secret dither is concealed by the transmitted message and by the host-interference . The parameter controls the amount of host-interference or "self-noise," thus affecting the robustness of the lattice datahiding scheme. However, from a security standpoint, one can take benefit of the randomness introduced by the self-noise for achieving good secrecy and complicating the attacker's task, as will be seen in Section III-A. Finally, the secret dither is assumed to be uniformly distributed in the Voronoi region , which turns out to be the worst case for the attacker [8] .
The statistical distribution of the observations seen by the attacker can be easily identified by recalling the flat-host assumption, which makes uniformly distributed in . Hence, it follows from (7) that: (8) with
. Using again the flat-host assumption, we can simply write Hence, , and . Under the assumption of uniform , it is elementary to prove that each watermarked signal is uniformly distributed over .
III. THEORETICAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
The amount of information that leaks from the observations is quantified by means of the mutual information [2] . Making use of the chain rule for entropies [10] , this mutual information can be rewritten in a more illustrative manner as (9) The first term in the right-hand side of (9) is the information leakage for KMA, which was studied in [8] . We recall here two fundamental properties of the KMA scenario, that will be frequently used in the remainder of this paper:
1) Under the assumption of uniform , the conditional pdf of the dither signal is [8, Sect. II]
where , and with (11) denotes the "feasible region" for the secret dither, conditioned on the observations and the embedded message sequence . 2) As shown in [8, Sect. III], the feasible region is always modulo-convex if (see [8, Sect . III] for the definition of modulo-convexity). In essence, this means that the feasible region is not composed of disjoint regions if , thus simplifying the analysis and the design of practical dither estimators. The third term in the right-hand side of (9) represents the achievable rate for a fair user (i.e., knowing the secret dither ), whereas the second term is the rate achievable by unfair users (which is not null, in general) that do not know . In this section, we first consider the possibility of achieving perfect secrecy about . Thereafter, we study the asymptotic behavior of the information leakage about in other situations where perfect secrecy is not achieved, and, finally, we analyze a practical lattice data-hiding scheme.
A. Theoretical and Practical Perfect Secrecy
If the lattice data-hiding scheme fulfills the condition (12) then it is said to provide "perfect secrecy," meaning that no information about can be obtained from the observations, no matter what the computational effort is employed by the attacker. As mentioned in Section II-C, each watermarked signal is uniformly distributed over , since we are assuming uniform . Hence, the closer the distribution of conditioned on to the uniform over is, the more secure the scheme is. Once the shaping lattice is fixed, the two free parameters for tuning such distribution are the set of coset leaders and the parameter . The possibility of achieving perfect secrecy is considered below in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. We recall that the messages embedded in different observations are assumed to be independent.
First, let us denote by , the -dimensional closed hypersphere of radius centered in . Define the "covering radius" of the lattice as (13) Lemma 1: Consider a sequence of nested lattice codes such that as . If , this sequence of lattice codes asymptotically achieves perfect secrecy as , and the statistical distribution of conditioned on converges to the uniform over . Proof: See Appendix A. 2 Lemma 1 shows that the information leakage can be reduced down to zero if the size of the alphabet is properly increased. Bear in mind that if the condition does not hold (i.e., if the coset leaders do not "cover" the whole Voronoi region of ), the resulting code does not necessarily offer good secrecy, even for high embedding rates (see Sections III-C and III-D, which deal with a lattice repetition code). It must be observed that an infinite alphabet size is not affordable in practice. However, this choice of alphabet is used in [7] for showing that a nested lattice code asymptotically achieves the capacity 2 The condition < 1 imposed in Lemma 1 comes from the necessity of having a continuous, Riemann integrable pdf for our proof to be valid. The case = 1, for which f(ỹ jt) becomes a probability mass function, cannot be dealt with using the arguments of Appendix A.
of the modulo-lattice Gaussian channel. Thus, Lemma 1 shows, in conjunction with [7] , that simultaneous maximization of robustness and security is theoretically (asymptotically) possible. Finally, we would like to remark that the result of asymptotic perfect secrecy holds for any distribution of the secret dither , not necessarily the uniform over (cf. Appendix A). In the next proposition, a nested code achieving perfect secrecy and realizable in practice is proposed.
Proposition 1: Any self-similar lattice code of rate and distortion compensation parameter achieves perfect secrecy. In that case, conditioned on is uniform over . Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, the proof of perfect secrecy can be reduced to show that the resulting scheme fulfills the condition . For , we have , so that the pdf defined in (8) is given by . Hence, under the assumption of equiprobable symbols, we can write (14) Taking into account that self-similar partitions fulfill the next "covering property" it follows that for every , exactly one exists such that . Hence, (14) becomes , so . Since the entropy of a continuous random variable with bounded support is upper bounded by the log-volume of its support set, we have Thus, we have , resulting in a null information leakage, and is necessarily uniform over regardless of the distribution of . Some important remarks to this result will be given.
Remark 1) The proof of perfect secrecy in Proposition 1 relies on the lattice code itself rather than on the statistical distribution of . Actually, the result holds for any distribution of the secret dither . However, it must be taken into account that the value of that provides perfect secrecy can conflict with other requirements (e.g., error probability), so it is important to properly choose the distribution of for maximizing the security when perfect secrecy cannot be attained. This distribution has been shown in [8] to be the uniform over , which yields also uniform over .
Remark 2) It is possible to show that for , the condition of perfect secrecy still holds. However, for , there are overlaps between adjacent symbols that produce nonzero error probability even in the absence of noise. This makes the use of channel coding necessary (i.e., error-correcting codes) to recover the embedded message reliably, thus breaking the hypothesis of independence between messages embedded in different blocks. As a result, perfect secrecy about cannot be ensured. To see this, consider a simple example with two observations , where the embedding parameters fulfill the conditions for perfect secrecy stated in Proposition 1. The mutual information between observations and secret dither is written as (15) whereas the rightmost term of (15) The proof of the proposition resorts to the flathost assumption to show null information leakage. This means that, in practice, small information leakages may exist due to the finite variance of the host signal, which causes the host distribution to not be strictly uniform in each quantization cell. However, this information leakage seems to be hardly exploitable in practical attacks. Remark 4) Perfect secrecy about does not necessarily mean perfect secrecy about the embedded messages. Using (9), the rate for the attacker under the condition of perfect secrecy is given by (16) This "unfair" rate is studied in Section III-C for the repetition coding lattice scheme.
B. Asymptotic Analysis and Comparison With KMA
When perfect secrecy is not attained, a closed-form expression for the information leakage cannot be given, in general. We are interested here in studying the general behavior of the information leakage for large and comparing it with the KMA scenario. By following a similar reasoning to that in [8, Sec. II], it can be shown that the mutual information in (9) is concave and increasing with . The second and third terms of (9) define the gap between the security level of KMA and WOA scenarios. More specifically, we will define the gap as (17) This gap, which is always positive, quantifies the information about that is lost due to the a priori ignorance of the embedded messages. As can be seen from (17), the gap can be formulated as "the information that provides about the embedded messages upon the observation of watermarked signals." The next lemma shows that without the knowledge of , an irreducible ambiguity exists in the estimation of the embedded message sequence. Lemma 2: Given observations, consider the a priori message space where all the message sequences are assumed to be a priori equiprobable. For , let us define the equivalence relation for some (18) Each equivalence class is composed of elements, and the sequences belonging to the same equivalence class have all of the same a posteriori probability. Proof: By the additive structure of , the operation , with , defines a bijective mapping . Then, for a message sequence , the operation yields different sequences of length when is varied from 0 to . Thus, each equivalence class as defined in (18) is composed of elements. The a posteriori probability of a message sequence is derived in Appendix B. For a sequence , combining (49) and (53) in Appendix B, we arrive at (19) Now, let us define , with an arbitrary vector constant for all . Clearly, , so . Hence, if , then and it follows that . Inserting this result in (19) and recalling that the message sequences are assumed to be a priori equiprobable, the lemma follows.
The structure of the equivalence classes depends on the mapping between the elements of and and on the lattice code itself. However, for lattice codes obtained through Construction A (following the procedure described in Section II-A), the equivalence relation (18) can be simply expressed as for some (20) where denotes the vector with its components equal to 1, and the modulo operation is applied componentwise. The proof directly follows from (18) simply by observing that for Construction A. By virtue of Lemma 2, if the messages embedded in different blocks are mutually independent, then the attacker can aspire (at most) at reducing the uncertainty about the embedded message sequence to a set of equiprobable sequences. The following theorem states how this ambiguity affects the information leakage about for large . Note that for any nested lattice code, a value exists such that for , we can ensure , so error-free decoding is guaranteed in the absence of noise. Obviously, in any case, although it will depend on the lattice code in general.
Theorem 1: For any nested lattice code, if is chosen such that , then
Proof: See Appendix C. The result of Theorem 1 has two main implications. 1) For low embedding rates (i.e., low ), the information per dimension that leaks about is approximately the same as if the attacker knew the embedded messages. This case is highly relevant in practice, since in practical scenarios, the watermarker usually resorts to low embedding rates that allow recovering the embedded message without the use of complex channel coding schemes. 2) As shown in Appendix C, when , the feasible regions associated with the only message sequences with nonnull probability converge to different vectors of the form , which are equiprobable. Thus, unambiguous estimation of the secret dither vector is not possible in the WOA scenario. The values of , for which Theorem 1 holds, guarantee that no decoding errors occur in the absence of noise. However, in some cases, it is advantageous to choose smaller values of (e.g., when a certain degree of attacking noise is expected [7] , [16] ). In such cases, the gap function does not necessarily achieve the value , but this seems to be valid as a lower bound, as we will check in Section III-C for the repetition coding lattice scheme.
Final remark: If the messages conveyed by different observations were not independent, the residual uncertainty expressed in Theorem 1 would be further reduced. This is the case, for instance, when a channel code is applied, since it could provide the attacker with information about the a priori probabilities of each message sequence. This consideration is important when high robustness against noise is sought or when is small, since the use of channel codes is mandatory in these cases for lowering the decoding error probability.
C. Theoretical Results for Cubic-Shaping Lattices With Repetition Coding
DC-DM with repetition coding using scalar quantizers, also known as the scalar costa scheme (SCS) with repetition coding [16] , is one of the most popular schemes for lattice data hiding. Redundant embedding of the information is performed by repeatedly embedding the same message in different host samples, using a pair of scalar lattices , , which yield , and , . For a -dimensional host vector , the embedding function (4) is particularized to (21) where the subindex indicates the th component of the -dimensional vector. This simple coding scheme, which results in a code of rate , is equivalent to a code obtained through Construction A with and . Bear in mind that due to the redundant embedding of the message, the repetition scheme provides the attacker with more information about the embedded message than a scheme where independent scalar embeddings are performed in parallel. Thus, one can intuitively realize that the repetition scheme analyzed here is less secure than the simple SCS. Fig. 3 shows two examples of lattice repetition codes for . Although the robustness of this data-hiding code has been analyzed in depth in [17] , here we are interested in analyzing its security properties.
In order to obtain the information leakage, we rewrite the third term of (9) as (22) In turn, the second term in the right-hand side of (9) Equation (23) does not admit a closed-form expression, although it is possible to accurately obtain the entropies of interest in a numerical manner.
1) Computation of the Achievable Rate for Fair Users:
The first term in the right-hand side of (23) represents the uncertainty about the embedded message when the secret dither is known. Under the flat-host assumption
The a posteriori probability of a certain message is given by for
where , , are the components of . From (25), we can see that the feasible messages (i.e., with non-null probability) are those whose coset leader is contained in the interval given by , and that the feasible messages are equiprobable. Given the symmetry of the pdf of , we can write for
where is the indicator function defined in (1), and with . 3 The expectation (26) is obtained numerically by Monte Carlo integration (averaging over the realizations of ).
2) Computation of the Achievable Rate for Unfair Users:
The second term in the right-hand side of (23) is given by (27) The a posteriori probability distribution of the message sequences can be obtained by combining (49) and (53) in Appendix B. For a message sequence (28)
For
, the feasible regions involved in the calculation of (28) are always modulo-convex hypercubes [8] , and as such, they can be easily computed componentwise. The entropy (27) is obtained by Monte Carlo, computing the probability of all the message sequences in a large set of realizations of . Notice that although the cardinality of the message space grows exponentially with , only the message sequences with non-null probability need to be taken into account, making the problem computationally feasible.
D. Numerical Results
The results shown in this section support some of the conclusions drawn in Sections III-A and B. Fig. 4 illustrates the information leakage about for the repetition code and provides a comparison with the results obtained for the KMA scenario. Fig. 4(a) shows the negative impact on the security level of increasing the dimensionality while keeping the size of the alphabet constant. Fig. 4(b) shows the security improvement brought about by the increase of the alphabet size, although this improvement is not very significant. Finally, notice in Fig. 4(a) and (b) that the gap between the information leakage for KMA and WOA tends asymptotically to a constant. For the case of Fig. 4(a) , Theorem 1 holds, so the asymptotic value of the gap is actually . In Fig. 4(b) , Theorem 1 holds only for , although for the larger values of , the gap can still be seen to be approximately . The gap is more deeply considered in the next paragraph. Fig. 5 shows the gap function defined in (17) for two instances of the lattice repetition code with different parameters. The code considered in Fig. 5(a) is for and , which is equivalent to binary SCS [16] , the simplest lattice code. By virtue of (7), the watermarked signal observed by the attacker is , where is uniform over the interval , with variance . For this code, the equivocation for a fair user is always 0 in a noiseless scenario whenever [16] . Thus, in this case, the gap function is equivalent to the equivocation about the embedded messages for the attacker [i.e.,
]. It can be seen that the gap tends in all cases to as is increased, as stated in Theorem 1, except in the case , where the gap increases indefinitely. The explanation for this behavior is simple: according to the scheme proposed in Proposition 1, the combination , , and provides perfect secrecy about , so the secret dither cannot be disclosed and, consequently, the embedded message sequence cannot be reliably estimated. However, as mentioned in Remark 4 of Section III-A, perfect secrecy about does not imply perfect secrecy about the message. In fact, if perfect secrecy about the message was achieved, then the gap should increase linearly in , but we can check in Fig. 5 (a) that it is far from being the case. Finally, Fig. 5(b) shows the gap for a repetition code with , . Bear in mind that this code provides error-free decoding only if . It can be seen that for values of that are sufficiently large, the gap nearly approaches . However, for smaller values of , the gap becomes slightly larger.
IV. PRACTICAL DITHER ESTIMATOR
A practical dither estimator for the WOA scenario is proposed in this section. Since the core of the estimation procedure is the estimator devised in [8, Sec. IV], the latter is briefly recalled in Section IV-A. Throughout this section, the secret dither will be assumed to be uniformly distributed in . Furthermore, channel coding across different blocks does not take place, so the message sequences will be considered to be a priori equiprobable. Notice that otherwise, the attacker could exploit the a priori probability of each message sequence, simplifying the estimation.
A. Set-Membership Estimator for the KMA Scenario
In case the embedded message is known by the attacker, the maximum-likelihood (ML) estimate of the secret dither given observations is given by any point in , the feasible region defined in (11) . The estimation algorithm proposed in [8] works by computing and picking the center of this region as the estimate of . 4 The only working assumption is that , in order to guarantee the modulo-convexity of the intersections [8, Sec. III]. After adding a certain offset to the observations, the feasible region defined by the th observation ( (11)) is redefined as where
Notice that in (29), we make explicit the dependence of with the embedded message . The aim of introducing the offset in every observation is to obtain a convex for all , as discussed in [8] . Obviously, this offset must be removed from the final dither estimate. Instead of directly computing , the estimation algorithm computes an outer bound using the "inner polytope" or the "optimal volume ellipsoid" (OVE) method. In this paper, we will consider only the former method, where is described by means of a set of linear inequalities which are the inputs to an optimization algorithm that computes an ellipsoid that bounds . This ellipsoid is completely defined by a vector and a positive-definite matrix . Thus, the ellipsoids allow us to describe the feasible regions with a reduced and constant number of parameters, independent of the complexity of the underlying region.
B. Joint Bayesian and Set-Membership Estimation for the WOA Scenario
The ML estimate of the secret dither in the WOA scenario can be expressed as
Estimation based on (30) is impractical due to the number of summation terms, which is exponentially increasing with the number of observations. In order to keep an affordable complexity for the estimation algorithm, we resort to the usual "Viterbi approximation," where the summation in (30) is approximated by the value of the maximum term. This way, approximate ML estimation of the dither amounts to estimating the most probable message sequence, and then performing dither estimation as in Section IV-A using the estimate of the embedded message. Mathematically, it can be written as with (31) At this point, we recall that the a priori path space is divided in equivalence classes (with elements each) defined by the relation (18) . Since the paths belonging to the same equivalence class have the same a posteriori probability (according to Lemma 2), the path in (31) is not unique. In order to get rid of this ambiguity, we will reduce the search space to one representative per equivalence class. At the same time, this strategy reduces the cardinality of the search space by a factor . Notice that this complexity reduction does not imply any loss in performance, since the whole set of feasible paths can be recovered from the set of equivalence classes.
It is important to clarify that the two-stage estimator just defined is suboptimal, in general, since its performance is subject to the correct estimate of the embedded message. However, it is not the final purpose of the security analysis to present the best estimator, but rather to show that the information leakages identified in the theoretical part can be exploited in practice. As for the estimator presented here, if fulfills the condition imposed in Theorem 1, then no loss of optimality is incurred for large . The reason is that for sufficiently large , only equiprobable feasible message sequences exist (which belong to the same equivalence class), as explained in the proof of the theorem. Since we are restricting the search to one representative per equivalence class, it is clear that the summation (30) will be equal to the value of the maximum term.
Hereinafter, we will use the term "path" for denoting each message sequence , . From Appendix B, we know that the a posteriori probability of the observations with is given by (32) The only term of (32) that depends on the hypothesized path is . This implies that, in practical terms, the most probable paths are those with the largest feasible region. Hence, we can define the "score" of the path as (33) which can be used to compare the probabilities of different paths as long as they have the same length. It follows that, given observations, the ML estimate of the most probable path is simply given by , where . The search for the most probable path can be carried out by means of a tree search where each branch of the tree represents a hypothesized path with an associated score. For saving computational resources, the outer bound introduced in Section IV-A and a "beam search" strategy [18, Chapt. 12 ] will be applied during the tree search. The steps of the proposed dither estimation algorithm are summarized in Algorithm 1. The input data are the observations and the parameters of the nested lattice code.
Algorithm 1: Secret dither estimation
Step 1) Initialization: , , , with denoting the number of feasible paths for the first observation (1 in our case).
Step 2) For a) Let be the set of feasible paths for the first observations. Construct a set of candidate paths as . b) Compute the ellipsoids using , , where denotes the th element of . c) Compute the score of each path as . Arrange the paths in order of descending score as . Now compute , subject to the constraint , . The parameters and are called "beam factors." The set of "surviving paths" for the next iteration is .
Step 3) Let be the path with the highest score resulting from Step 2), and let , defined as the center of , be the dither estimate associated with (this choice minimizes the mean-squared error of the estimate [18] ). The paths belonging to the equivalence class can be computed according to (18) , and the corresponding dither estimates are given by (34) Note that is added in order to cancel the offset introduced in Step 2b. Remark 1) Through the variation of the "beam factor" , one can control the tradeoff between computational complexity and accuracy. If , only the most probable path is retained in each iteration of Algorithm 1. Hence, complexity reaches its minimum for , but the probability of missing the correct path may be very high. As is increased, the number of surviving paths per iteration increases in general. In the case , all of the paths are retained in each iteration, making the complexity unaffordable, in general, but reducing the probability of missing the correct path to 0. The impact of varying is shown in Section IV-C-1. Notice that does not limit the absolute number of paths to be considered in each iteration. This is why the parameter is also introduced in Step 2c, for limiting the complexity in absolute terms.
Remark 2) It is possible that
Step 2c results in . If this is the case, then it means that the true path has been discarded at some previous iteration of the algorithm due to too restrictive beam factors and/or . If this occurs, Algorithm 1 must be restarted after increasing the values of the beam factors.
Remark 3) The outer bounding of the feasible regions may negatively impact the estimator performance due to the introduction of spurious paths and variation of the scores.
Remark 4) When the shaping lattice is cubic, the feasible regions are hyperrectangles. In such cases, they can be easily computed componentwise, since they are simply defined by real segments. Thus, there is no need to apply the inner polytope algorithm when the shaping lattice is cubic.
The computation of all the outer bounding ellipsoids in Step 2b is the most time-consuming task of the estimation algorithm. Clearly, this step can be sped up if we can use a fast algorithm to discard the "unfeasible" paths. Formally, a certain path and is said to be "unfeasible" or "inconsistent" with the observations if the associated feasible region is an empty set; otherwise, the path is said to be "feasible" or "consistent." That is, the unfeasible paths are those that yield a null score (i.e., null a posteriori probability), so it is not worth keeping them for the next iteration. Thus, Step 2b in Algorithm 1 must be broken down in two steps:
Step 2b-i checks the feasibility of the candidate paths, and Step 2b-ii, which is the same as the original 2b of Algorithm 1, computes only the feasible region of the feasible paths.
For the first observations, we have the pairs . In order to check the feasibility of a certain candidate path , , and , we need to check whether the intersection is empty or not. To this end, we have used an algorithm based on the OVE algorithm proposed in [19] , which will be described.
Algorithm 2: Check unfeasible paths
According to [8, Sec . IV], assume the feasible region for the th observation can be specified by a matrix and a vector such that , where
is and the th column of , is the th element of , and is a vector in the th facet of . For and : 1) compute where and are the positive-definite matrix and center defining the ellipsoid ; 2) if , for some , then the hypothesized path is unfeasible; otherwise, the path is declared as feasible. 5 
C. Experimental Results
This section presents the results of applying Algorithm 1 over some practical lattice DC-DM schemes. The experiments have been carried out under the following assumptions: the host signals follow a i.i.d. Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance , and the DWR is 30 dB in all cases ; the embedded messages are equiprobable (i.e., no coding is applied along different blocks), and the attacker knows the parameters of the nested lattice code being used, as stated in Section II. In order to assess the performance of the dither estimator without ambiguities (due to the result of Lemma 2), it is assumed that the message conveyed by the first observation corresponds to the symbol 0. The parameter of Algorithm 1 has been set to 250 in all cases.
1) Tradeoff Complexity-Accuracy: One interesting performance measure is the resulting probability of decoding error when the decoder uses the dither estimate, instead of the true dither vector. If this measure is represented in terms of the "beam factor" of Algorithm 1, then the tradeoff between complexity and accuracy becomes patent. This tradeoff is illustrated in Fig. 6(a) for a cubic shaping lattice and repetition coding (see Section III-C) with and . Using dither estimates obtained with observations, the numerically computed symbol error rate (SER) is shown in Fig. 6(a) for different values of . For reference, Fig. 6(a) also shows, in dashed lines, the SER obtained by a fair decoder (i.e., knowing the true dither signal). As can be seen, the SER is always decreased as is increased, achieving the same decoding performance as the fair decoder in the cases of and . However, for , the SER of the unfair decoder is slightly larger. The reason is that in this case, the probability of deciding a wrong dither is not negligible even for high .
2) Estimation Error: Now we measure the performance of the estimator in terms of the MSE per dimension between the dither estimate and the actual dither vector. Three different shaping lattices have been considered. In all cases, a beam factor 45 dB has been used. Fig. 6(b) shows the results obtained for a scheme using a cubic-shaping lattice in ten dimensions and repetition coding with . It can be seen that for , it is still possible to attain the same accuracy as in the KMA scenario, whereas for and , a significant degradation of the MSE is observed. This degradation is a consequence of the fact that, as is increased, the probability of correctly retrieving the embedded path decreases when is kept constant (even knowing the true value of the dither). 6 In the experiments, the probability of choosing an incorrect path has been found to be around 0.05 and 0.1 for and , respectively. Fig. 7(a) shows the results obtained for a hexagonal shaping lattice and . Notice that, although is higher than in the former case, the maximum embedding rate considered now is substantially larger ( bits versus bits). Similar as before, we can see that increasing degrades the MSE: for , it is still possible to achieve the same accuracy as in the KMA scenario, but for , the MSE is increased, and for , the MSE is not reduced with . Finally, Fig. 7(b) shows the results obtained for the shaping lattice [11] , the best lattice quantizer in eight dimensions. It can be seen that in this case, even with large alphabets (e.g., ), the estimator achieves its optimal performance. The results of Fig. 7 correspond to lattice codes obtained through Construction A. The inner polytope algorithm has been used for computing the approximate feasible regions. 
D. Reversibility Attack
An accurate dither estimate (subjected to an unknown modulo-shift, as the one obtained here) allows implementing a number of harmful attacks. As an illustrative example, we present a reversibility attack here, consisting in producing an estimate of the original host signal. In the context of lattice-data hiding methods, our attack is based on the fact that the embedding function is reversible whenever and we know and the embedded message. Using our dither and path estimates , the host estimate corresponding to the th watermarked block is computed as 7 ( 36) It is interesting to note that the ambiguity in the estimated message does not negatively affect the host estimation whenever the estimated path belongs to the equivalence class (defined in (18)) of the actual embedded path. The reason is that the dither estimate associated with any path in yields the same fine 7 The same reversibility function had been proposed in [16] in the context of scalar lattices lattice and, thus, it is valid for performing a successful reversibility attack. This can be readily seen if we realize that the dither estimates associated with the equivalence class of , given by (34), differ only in the term , and that , for . Fig. 8 shows the result of implementing the proposed reversibility attack on a real watermarked image. The parameters of the watermarking algorithm are , , , and the coset leaders were obtained through Construction A. The watermark is embedded in the low-frequency coefficients of 8 8 nonoverlapping DCT blocks, resulting in a peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) after embedding of 38.2 dB. The resulting host estimate, using only the message and dither estimates from the first 50 DCT blocks, is shown in Fig. 8(b) and presents a PSNR of approximately 56 dB. If the estimated host is quantized back to integers, then , meaning that the host has been estimated perfectly.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented an investigation of the security provided by data-hiding schemes based on nested lattice codes randomized by means of secret dithering. Although it has been shown that it is theoretically possible to achieve perfect secrecy, the security level of many practical scenarios (i.e., simple shaping lattices, low embedding rates, etc.) can be fairly low. In fact, the security weaknesses of the data-hiding schemes studied in this paper have been shown to be exploitable in practice with affordable complexity, allowing, for instance, to obtain host estimates with high fidelity. One obvious strategy for minimizing security risks is to reuse the secret key as few times as possible, but this may introduce serious synchronization problems. Another strategy is to look for more secure forms of randomization or choosing the embedding parameters that maximize the security: in general, the information leakage about the secret dither can be reduced by increasing the embedding rate or decreasing , but this solution demands more powerful error-correcting codes (ECCs) if one wants to guarantee reliable transmission. A possible drawback, as noted in this paper, is that the use of ECCs may introduce statistical dependence between different observations that could be exploited by an attacker, particularly for simple ECCs. The complexity of exploiting the information leakage provided by ECCs deserves further study in the future.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1 First, one must realize that if the assumption of independence between embedded messages holds, then null information leakage for one observation implies perfect secrecy for all . Thus, the proof of perfect secrecy can be reduced to show that the condition is fulfilled. With a little abuse of notation, in this appendix, we will denote the pdf of conditioned on by , for making the dependence clear with , the alphabet size. We will first consider the term . Due to the flat-host assumption, we have for any . Hence, we need to calculate (37) Computation of the integral in (37) is unaffordable. However, by virtue of the bounded convergence theorem [20, Ch. 4 ], the integral sign and limit can be interchanged if the integrand converges pointwise and (38) where is any function such that . In our case, it suffices to choose a constant function
The integral of for this choice is finite, since by assumption. Thus, (37) can be computed as (39)
For the moment, we turn our attention to the computation of the limit of the conditioned pdf. The pdf of conditioned on is given by (40) where the second equality follows from the definition of nesting ratio (cf. Section II-A). By recalling the definition of the function in (8) , (40) Hence, the sum is equivalent to counting the points that fall inside the region . Let us denote by , the subset of points of for which the indicator function (42) is nonnull. The set induces a partition (according to ) of the region . Since each term in the sum is multiplied by , the result is an approximation of the volume of (which is equal to up to a set of measure zero), i.e., (43) where represents the discrepancy between and the value of the sum, which comes from the points of close to the boundary of . Recall that, by definition of covering radius (cf. (13)) (44) where is the -dimensional closed ball of radius . Hence, if as , the term goes to 0 as well, and we have the definition of -dimensional Riemann integral: 8 (45) 8 Notice that the volume of Z(3) can be computed by means of a Riemann integral, because for < 1, Z(3) is compact, and it is the linear (and invertible)
image of an n-dimensional hypercube.
Finally, by substituting (45) into (41), we arrive at (46) In order to compute the limit in (39), we observe that the function is continuous in , with finite , so it is uniformly continuous on that interval. Therefore, (39) can be computed as (47) As for the other term involved in the mutual information , we know that the entropy of a continuous random variable with bounded support can be upper bounded by the log-volume of its support set. Thus, we can write
, it is immediate from (47) and (48) that , fulfilling the condition of perfect secrecy regardless of the distribution of , and Lemma 1 follows.
APPENDIX B A posteriori PROBABILITY OF THE MESSAGE SEQUENCES
In order to compute the a posteriori probability of a message sequence (hereinafter, a "path"), this probability is first rewritten using Bayes' rule (49)
We will focus on the probability a posteriori of the observations, which can be written as (50) where the second equality follows from the mutual independence between the observations when the secret dither is known. Equation (50) can be rewritten as (51) If the same procedure is applied recursively to the leftmost term in the right-hand side of (51), we arrive at the following factorization for the a posteriori probability:
In order to compute each factor of (52), we recall the flat-host assumption, which implies that . Thus, each factor of (52) can be seen as a circular convolution over . Furthermore, under the assumption that , the conditional pdf of the dither is given by (10) . By combining (8) and (10) , it can be seen that the integrand of the th factor in (52) is for such that otherwise.
The condition on in the equation just shown is equivalent to such that , so each factor in (52) is proportional to the volume of . Finally, (52) can be succinctly expressed as shown in (53) We say that the sequences fulfilling the above condition are "feasible" given the set of observations. The proof of the theorem is based on the concept of feasibility.
First, let us denote by the message sequence embedded in the observations. We will arrange, without loss of generality, the message space in two disjoint subsets: , which will represent the sequences in the equivalence class of , and , which will represent the remaining sequences in . For the sake of clarity, the proof will be conducted in four steps.
Step 1) In this step, we will show that all the sequences in the equivalent class of are feasible. Note that from (7) This proves that for the message sequences belonging to the equivalence class of , the intersection (54) is always nonempty, since at least the point is contained in the intersection.
Step 2) In this step, we prove that the feasible regions of the message sequences that belong to the equivalence class of asymptotically converge to , . First, we prove the next lemma, concerned with the asymptotic convergence of . Lemma 3: If the secret dither takes the value , then converges almost surely to as . Proof: The sequence , which for simplicity will be denoted by is equal to the true message sequence embedded in . Assume that the secret dither, which is fixed for all , takes the value . The random variable defined as is uniformly distributed over . For , the feasible region is a modulo-convex set. For any lattice , can be upper bounded by , where is the covering radius of defined in (13) , and denotes the -dimensional closed hypersphere of radius centered in . Therefore
The intersection between two hyperspheres of radius becomes arbitrarily small as the distance between the centers of both spheres approaches . In the limit, their intersection is the unique point equidistant to the two centers. This means that the feasible region converges to if the maximum distance between the modulo--reduced observations approaches . For this condition to hold, at least one observation must be arbitrarily close to a certain vertex of , and at least another observation , with , must be arbitrarily close to another vertex at distance . Intuitively, the probability of finding such a pair of observations goes to 1 almost surely as . Let us define the random variable , with and . Formally, we want to show that , which is equivalent to show that for all (57) In order to prove almost sure convergence, it is sufficient to prove that the sum is finite. In such a case, almost sure convergence follows by virtue of the Borel-Cantelli lemma [21] . The probability of interest can be obtained as (58) The probabilities in (58) can be easily computed by taking into account the geometrical interpretation provided by Fig. 9 , using a hexagonal lattice as an example. For the first probability in the right-hand side of (58), we have with . Following a similar calculation for the other term involved in (58), we can write 
and consequently
Since this sum is finite, the result (57) follows as a consequence of the Borel-Cantelli lemma. Hence, we have proved that the feasible region of converges to a single point as . As shown in Lemma 2, the feasible region for the sequences in the equivalence class of only differ in their centers: for , . Combining this result with Lemma 3 and with the result of Step 1), it follows that the feasible regions of the sequences in the equivalence class of converge to , , as .
Step 3) Now we consider the sequences not belonging to the equivalence class of . We will prove that these sequences are all unfeasible for sufficiently large . Among the elements of this set of sequences, consider a sequence which, for some , is equal to for all but for a certain . Consider the feasible region of this sequence, which is given by (59) For all , , for some fixed . Hence, using the result of Step 2) . Since for fixed , the observations are uniformly distributed over , the probability of observing such goes to 1 as . Therefore, any sequence not belonging to the equivalence class of is unfeasible for .
Step 4) The three previous steps have shown that the only message sequences in that have nonnull probability when are those belonging to the equivalence class of . We know, by Lemma 2, that all of these sequences are equiprobable. Hence, if the attacker has enough computational power for checking an exponentially increasing number of intersections, then his or her uncertainty about the embedded message sequence becomes for , and the theorem follows.
